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Civilised strategies for protecting outdoor poultry from Avian Flu H5N1
The Organic Research CentreAs global trade increases and brings about
greater movement of goods, services,
people and livestock, it also brings about
the globalisation of disease. The old
methods of disease control in livestock –
isolation and slaughter to maintain disease
free trade areas – are inadequate and
unacceptable. Vaccination - which is safe,
scientific and effective – must become the
central strategy of global disease control in
livestock.
After the slaughter of millions of animals
in the 2001 Foot and Mouth (FMD)
outbreak many people thought that the 
UK Government had learnt the lesson 
and vaccination would be employed in
any other global outbreak of an “A list”
livestock disease. 
Yet here we are in 2006 facing the
prospect of Avian Influenza in the UK with
few stocks of vaccine available, no
approved plans for widespread vaccination
and with significant opposition to
preventive vaccination within Government
circles. There is an apparent willingness
amongst politicians and officials to ignore
animal welfare by permanently housing
outdoor birds thereby destroying the free
range and organic markets in an attempt
to maintain an outmoded disease free
status for the nation. 
There are plans and preparations 
to gas millions of birds or smother them
with foam (no doubt well away from the
television cameras this time). No plans to
vaccinate but we are ready to slaughter.
The facts as set out in this report are
clear –
• Avian Influenza has spread around the
world and is likely to become endemic
in wild birds in the UK
• There are multiple transmission routes
and it is possible that wild birds are not
the most potent one but they probably
pose some degree, as yet
unascertained, of threat to outdoor
poultry
• The Government’s Chief Scientific
Advisor has unequivocally stated that
when AI becomes endemic in the UK all
free range and organic flocks will have
to be housed for the duration of the
epidemic, which could be five years or
more. To date there has been no other
policy statement from government
• Housing outdoor flocks will inevitably
cause serious animal welfare problems
as has been experienced in Holland
and Germany
• It will also mean the end of the growing
market for free-range and organic poultry
• Preventive vaccination is an alternative
strategy which has worked successfully
against AI in other countries as part of
an integrated approach with biosecurity
• There are no credible scientific arguments
against the use of preventive vaccination
but there are strong arguments in favour
• At the very least – as AI seems likely 
to become established in the UK during
2007 – the Government should be
drawing up plans and obtaining the
necessary approvals and stocks of
vaccines to ensure the UK has the
option to use vaccination
• A truly rational government would
acknowledge that preventive vaccination
is the most effective method of
combating AI in the modern world and
would now be preparing to vaccinate all
outdoor and organic flocks
If vaccination is scientifically based; if
large amounts of money have been spent
developing, testing and storing vaccines; 
if vaccination works as it demonstrably
does, why is the government so reluctant
to use it? As with FMD, it seems that the
answer lies in the less than transparent,
some might say murky waters of trade
regulation. 
The whole concept of trade in livestock
products based on disease - free zones,
maintained by the traditional methods 
of isolation and slaughter, is outdated and
barbaric. A whole mindset change on the
prevention and control of serious trans-
boundary disease is required. We aspire 
to live in a modern, enlightened world.
Let’s allow our livestock to do the same.
Lawrence Woodward O.B.E.
Elm Farm Research Centre
The Organic Research Centre
July 2006
“Vaccines are crucial to the development of sustainable
disease control methods for livestock farming.”  
This statement from the UK’s Institute for Animal Health 2005 
Annual Report is the underpinning message of the following pages. 
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Organic broilers leading an outdoor life at Sheepdrove Organic Farm, Berkshire. 
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An endemic disease
The UK Government’s chief scientific
adviser, Professor Sir David King says we
must plan for H5N1 to be in this country
for five years or more.
We are talking about the possibility of this
disease becoming endemic here in the
UK... it is a long-term factor, Sir David told
BBC News in February 2006. 
This long-term threat though is not being
matched by long-term solutions. The UK
Government, and Defra in particular,
appears permanently wedded to outdated,
barbaric policies of culling and destruction
without proper investigation of alternative,
vaccination options.
All poultry will have to be kept indoors for
the duration (five years or more…) is 
Dr. King’s analysis; regardless of the fact
that people increasingly want outdoor
poultry products; regardless of the fact that
indoor, industrialised systems seem to be
closely implicated in the genesis and
spread of this virus; regardless of the
evidence that the transmission of the virus
from wild birds to extensive, outdoor
poultry systems is much less likely than
was initially feared; and regardless of the
fact that preventive vaccination provides a
sure and scientifically robust way of
protecting outdoor poultry from the virus.
The end of organic 
and free-range poultry
Without the use of vaccination 
and with all UK poultry locked up inside,
the Government and Dr. King are
consigning organic and free-range poultry
to oblivion. There has to be a better
way…and preventive vaccination is it.
In 2001 Elm Farm Research Centre
(EFRC) spearheaded efforts to persuade
the UK Government to adopt vaccination
as part of its control programme against
the catastrophic foot and mouth outbreak.
We failed.
Official ruminations (and loud arguments
against vaccination from the intensive
livestock sector) kept vaccination in 2001
out of the UK’s chosen armoury of controls
against OIE (Office International des
Epizooties, World Organisation for Animal
Health) List A of highly contagious, trans-
boundary diseases. That list contains foot
and mouth disease (FMD) classical swine
fever (CSF) and avian influenza (AI).
Without a planned vaccination strategy 
in place, the 2001 FMD outbreak directly
cost the lives of 6.47 million UK farm
animals (Defra figs) along with many
others in the European Union. The
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA)
says the stark financial cost of the 2001
outbreak ran to some 12 billion Euros
(£8.6 billion) across the European Union.
Such huge costs in livestock lives and
national exchequer expenditure could have
been minimized by the modern application
of vaccination alongside such techniques
as DIVA (Differentiate Infected from
Vaccinated Animals) techniques in turn
allied to rapid in-field diagnostics. 
These techniques, developed in Italy,
allow scientists and governments to
separate those animals that have been
vaccinated from animals which have been
exposed to and infected by “field strains”
of disease.
Lessons learned?
Fast forward to 2006 and the threat of
avian influenza. After a multitude of
“Lessons Learned” enquiries and the
passing of five years of scientific and
research endeavour do we now have
detailed vaccination plans/ strategies in
place in the UK to help control FMD,
avian influenza and other OIE List A
diseases? The simple answer is no.
Whole armies of scientists are employed
across the world to develop vaccines and
the systems with which to deliver and
monitor them. The UK’s Institute for
Animal Health at Pirbright and Compton,
which is at the forefront of this work, says
the pinnacle of its research effort is the
production of vaccines. But what use is
scientific advance and high tech vaccine
without the political and trade structures
within which to use it?
Millions of doses of vaccines are stocked
at great expense on chilled shelves waiting
for a political decision to use them. The
goal of all those involved in the animal
health sector has to be a move away from
barbaric slaughter and isolationism to the
new realities of world trade and global
travel, utilising new technological
approaches to trans-boundary diseases.
H5N1 avian influenza (AI) is poised to become endemic across Europe and within
the UK. It is a disease we will all have to learn to live with. This spring it has
swept westwards from S E Asia through Turkey and across the EU to surface in
Fife and Norfolk. By whatever mechanisms it is transported (wild birds, poultry
products, human travel), it will be back.4 | Vaccination Nation
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It is alarming, that once again (following
the debacle of FMD in 2001) the
“stakeholder” voices being selected in the
formulation of UK policy have not been
truly representative. That must change. 
The need to end the historic and
disproportionate focus of attention on the
needs of large-scale, industrial agriculture
was one of the reasons that Defra was
created five years ago. It must now prove
that the transition from MAFF to Defra has
more substance than a simple name-
change.
Defra must commit itself to draw up, at the
very least, a draft AI preventive vaccination
campaign ready for Autumn 2006.
Alongside such a plan it must ensure that
the UK has access to sufficient stocks of
suitable AI vaccines.
When representatives from the small,
organic and free-range poultry keepers and
producers finally made it through Defra’s
doors to a stakeholder meeting on June 2nd
2006, they forced debate on preventive
vaccination on to the agenda, driving home
key vaccination messages (right).
At the meeting, Defra listened politely and
attentively. The danger is that listening is
all that the officials are minded to do. 
Not a single voice was raised at the June
2nd meeting against the principle of Defra
assembling a preventive vaccination
strategy to present to the EU for approval.
But still the declared public position of Defra
(www.defra.gov.uk) and the leaders of the
industrial British poultry industry is that they
cannot support a policy of preventive
vaccination. Ministers, it appears, lack
engagement with the issue. 
As one official puts it – in “peacetime”
when the avian flu is absent from the UK,
Ministers ask what is the problem – why
debate vaccination? When the disease is
present such as in Fife and in Norfolk,
then it’s all hands to the pump and
another exercise in fire-fighting – no time
for debating vaccination...  
The continuing antipathy of Defra and 
the UK Government to well planned
preventive vaccination as a precaution
against the spread of H5N1 AI is outdated
and misguided. Like many (but not all)
Governments across the EU, the UK claims
to be confident that slaughter and ring
vaccination around any focus of infection
will stamp out the disease.
Such a policy is flawed in at least two
ways. It relies on rapid and accurate
identification of infected holdings. This in
turn relies on extensive, active surveillance
using on-site diagnostics and
epidemiological predictions of the onward
spread of the virus – not an easy job when
wild bird and extensive poultry and product
movements are involved.
Once unprotected flocks are infected, huge
amounts of virus are shed by infected birds,
putting people as well as other poultry and
livestock at risk. In the face of this,
vaccination – where two doses of vaccine
are needed over a four week period before
birds are fully protected – used in a ring
fence strategy will have an impact but it is
less effective than if it was used ahead of
any emergency in a preventive programme.
True preventive vaccination, targeted in
intensive poultry areas and in organic and
outdoor flocks is the only logical defence
against H5N1. Vaccinated birds display 
far greater resistance to infection and if 
they are infected they produce and shed
significantly reduced levels of virus.
We urge Defra to act now to –
i/    agree a preventive vaccination plan for free-range and organic poultry, 
hobby birds and pure breeds
ii/   submit the plan to Brussels for approval in time for autumn 2006; there
should not be months of delay in putting a policy in place
iii/  ensure there is sufficient vaccine available to stock a preventive vaccination
campaign
What bird keepers want is a policy. This is not vaccination now. These keepers have
so far been poorly represented at meetings with Defra, and not in significant force
when faced with the demands of the industrial poultry sectoy. 
Stakeholders who have agreed a non-vaccination policy with Defra are from the
“industrial” poultry industry: they prefer to use biosecurity. Keepers of cage and
aviary birds are also happy to follow this policy. What they each have in common 
is that their birds are normally kept indoors. 
Organic, free range and many hobby birds are kept outdoors. The birds are not
normally housed except in overnight accommodation. In some cases, the birds 
live outside 24 hours a day. Welfare is severely compromised if the birds are to 
be 'brought indoors' for 30 days. In the case of an incidence of H5N1 there is 
no guarantee that 30 days is sufficient confinement. 
As of now in Germany, confinement continues to extend beyond three months 
and is planned to continue over the whole summer season. 
Avian Influenza: The urgent establishment of a policy for
preventive vaccination for hobby birds and free-range birds 
The Organic Research CentreVaccination Nation | 5 
AVIAN INFLUENZA
Thank you for your email of 24 February to Margaret Beckett regarding avian
influenza (AI) vaccine.  I have been asked to reply.
Vaccination does offer potential benefits in disease control, but currently available
vaccines are too limited to provide a general solution.  There is provision in the
Diseases of Poultry (England) Order 2003 for the imposition of a compulsory
vaccination zone.  
Crucially, although these vaccines protect against disease, they will not prevent birds
from becoming infected and shedding virus, hiding the symptoms of disease.
Although vaccination will reduce the amount of virus shed by birds and hence the
viral load, this reduced amount may be still significant and could cause infection in
other birds.
The vaccines that are currently available to protect against AI disease are inactivated
types and need to be delivered by injecting birds individually.  It can take up to three
weeks for birds to develop optimum protective immunity and some poultry require
two doses.  Delivering such a vaccine, as an emergency measure, to large numbers
of birds can raise significant logistical difficulties.
There may be circumstances during an outbreak when emergency vaccination would
be appropriate but this would be subject to a risk assessment at the time and
emergency use of vaccine also requires approval by the EU.
Although there are strategies to differentiate vaccinated birds from infected birds,
such as the use of distinguishing infected from vaccinated animals (DIVA) strategies
and unvaccinated sentinel birds, vaccination may lead to difficulties in identifying
birds that are carrying the virus; this can be a problem for control.
Despite these limitations Defra is urgently considering all aspects of vaccination and
the options for using them to control disease.  The review is taking account of  the
vaccination programmes used in other countries. There may be a role for vaccination
in the protection of zoological collections of rare breeds or endangered species.
Subject to risk assessment on the possible introduction of avian influenza by wild
birds, the AI Directive allows birds to be vaccinated subject to Defra submitting a
plan to the Commission for its approval.
I hope this letter goes some way towards addressing your concerns.
Yours sincerely
Central Communications Unit
Defra
LONDON
Misunderstanding at Defra?
Arguments against preventive vaccination
focus on “spread by stealth” allowing the
virus to circulate undetected in treated
birds which display no outward symptoms.
There are also fears that virus circulating
in vaccinated birds can mutate into
potentially more lethal forms. 
Such views are well illustrated in this letter
to EFRC in February 2006 from the office
of the then Defra Secretary of State,
Margaret Beckett. But they are views that
have little basis in the latest science.
We do have a sophisticated animal health
network in the EU which can tackle both
these perceived problems. The OIE
supports preventive vaccination when 
it is monitored by testing and the use of
sentinel birds. Vaccination would be with 
a marker vaccine -such as H5N2 – or with
the latest bivalent Newcastle Disease/AI
vaccines, both of which allow DIVA and
subsequent antibody tests to distinguish
clearly between naturally infected birds and
treated birds. 6 | Vaccination Nation
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Vaccination success stories
There are Avian Influenza preventive
vaccination success stories elsewhere 
in the world, and they are well reviewed 
in the scientific literature.
In Northern Italy, vaccination programmes
against H5 and H7  have worked in an
area that was suffering repeated AI
outbreaks. Hong Kong has been
successfully protected by vaccination
against the threat of infection by H5N1
from mainland China. 
The Italian scientist Ilaria Capua is a world
expert in AI, its spread and its control. She
runs the OIE world reference laboratory for
the disease and published the following
summary paper on vaccination in May
2003. It reviewed possible strategies for
the control of AI infections and included
an overview of the advantages and
disadvantages of using conventional,
inactivated vaccines and recombinant
(genetically modified) vaccines.
Ilaria Capua concluded that if vaccination
is accepted as an option for the control of
AI, vaccine banks, including companion
diagnostic tests, must be established and
made available for immediate use.
May 2003
Ilaria Capua & Stefano Marangon
Istituto Zoprofilattico Sperimentale delle Venezie, Via Romea 14/A 35020, 
Legnaro (PD), Italy
Summary: Recent epizootics of highly
contagious OIE List A diseases, such
as foot and mouth disease, classical
swine fever and avian influenza (AI),
led to the implementation of
stamping-out policies resulting in the
depopulation of millions of animals.
The enforcement of a control strategy
that is based only on the application
of sanitary restrictions on farms and
that involves the culling of animals
that are infected, suspected of being
infected or suspected of being
contaminated, may not be sufficient to
avoid the spread of infection,
particularly in areas that have high
animal densities, and thus results in
mass depopulation.
In the European Union, the directive
that imposes the enforcement of a
stamping-out policy (92/40/EC) for AI
was adopted in 1992, although it was
drafted in the 1980s. The poultry
industry has undergone substantial
changes in the past 20 years, mainly
resulting in shorter production cycles
and in greater animal densities per
territorial unit. 
Due to these changes, infectious
animal diseases are significantly more
difficult to control because of the
greater number of susceptible animals
reared per given unit of time and to the
difficulties in applying adequate
biosecurity measures.
The slaughter and destruction of large
numbers of animals is also
questionable from an ethical point of
view, particularly when the human
health implications are negligible. Mass
depopulation has raised serious ethical
concerns among the general public,
and has recently given rise to high
costs and serious economic losses for
governments, stakeholders and,
ultimately, for consumers.
In the past, the use of vaccines in
such emergencies was limited by the
inability to differentiate vaccinated/
infected from vaccinated/non-infected
animals. 
The major concern was that the
disease could spread further through
trade or movement of apparently
uninfected animals or products of
animal origin, or that the disease
might be exported to other countries.
For this reason export bans have been
imposed on countries enforcing a
vaccination policy.
The use of vaccination as an option 
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Vaccination works 
for Hong Kong
The Hong Kong vaccination experience is
just as convincing. Research and practice
in Hong Kong demonstrates that the Defra
argument of uninfected birds which are
vaccinated preventively, going on to
subsequently shed the virus and propagate
the epidemic is just not the case. 
From 2003 all Hong Kong commercial
birds have been vaccinated, and there 
has been no avian influenza case in those
treated birds, or in sentinel birds, since
vaccination began. A research paper in
Avian Pathology (2004) shows complete
efficacy. 
(Ellis TM et al. Vaccination of chickens
against H5N1 avian influenza in the 
face of an outbreak interrupts virus
transmission. Avian Pathology, 2004,
33(4): 405–412) 
Even without 100 per cent coverage,
vaccines are still effective as David
Swayne et al of the United States
Department of Agriculture reported 
in his 2006 research paper.
The take home message from Swayne is
that the vaccines do protect completely
against mortality and morbidity. While all
non-vaccinated birds excreted large 
amounts of virus, the majority of
vaccinated birds did not excrete any virus.
The minority excreted 10,000 to 100,000
times less virus than the controls.    
Similar results were obtained in a Dutch
study - the 2004 Animal Sciences Group,
Wageningen University experiment with
wild ducks and H7N7 avian influenza. 
If the vaccine did not give complete
protection, virus shedding was at such low
levels that infection of other birds did not
take place. 
Quite simply, on the real science of AI
vaccination, Defra is being obtuse. The
argument to vaccinate - or not vaccinate 
- is about risk. Which risk is more serious
- to leave birds unprotected to infect other
birds and humans, or to reduce risk and
infection?
A double vaccine
Vaccine research efforts are now focussed
on the production of cheap, easy to apply
and attractive vaccines for the poultry
industry. The most recent advance has
been the production of dual vaccines.
These can be applied without the
requirement for injection to protect birds
against both Newcastle Disease (NCD)
and avian influenza (H5N1). NCD, an
economically important viral disease of
poultry, is currently controlled by routine
vaccination. 
The researchers say they have produced
this combination vaccine by inserting a
bird flu gene into the NCD genome.  
The resulting recombinant virus induced
antibody production against both NCD 
and avian influenza and protected
chickens against these diseases after
exposure to lethal doses of both viruses.
This study demonstrates the possibility of
designing affordable and effective vaccines
against multiple poultry diseases
The vaccine is administered as a droplet
and can be used in day-old chicks. 
David E. Swayne, Chang-Won Lee and
Erica Spackman
Southeast Poultry Research Laboratory,
Agricultural Research Service, United
States Department of Agriculture,934
College Station Road, Athens, GA
30605, USA
“High-pathogenicity (HP) avian
influenza (AI) virus of the H5N1
subtype has caused an unprecedented
epizootic in birds within nine Asian
countries/regions since it was first
reported in 1996. Vaccination has
emerged as a tool for use in managing
the infection in view of future
eradication. This study was undertaken
to determine whether two divergent
H5N2 commercial vaccine strains, one
based on a European and the other a
North American low-pathogenicity AI
virus, could protect chickens against a
recent Asian H5N1 HPAI virus.
The North American and European
vaccine viruses had 84 and 91%
deduced amino acid sequence
similarity to the HA1 segment of
haemagglutinin protein of Indonesia
H5N1 HPAI challenge virus,
respectively. Both vaccine strains
provided complete protection from
clinical signs and death.
The vaccines reduced the number of
chickens infected and shedding virus
from the respiratory and intestinal
tracts at the peak of virus replication. 
In addition, the quantity of virus shed
was reduced by 104 to 105 median
embryo infectious doses. The use of
specific neuraminidase inhibition tests
allowed identification of infected
chickens within the vaccinated groups. 
These data indicate that the currently
available H5 vaccines of European and
North American lineages will protect
chickens against the Asian H5N1 HPAI
virus and reduce environmental
contamination by the H5N1 HPAI
virus. They will be an adjunct to
biosecurity measures to reduce virus
transmission.”
Inactivated North American and European H5N2 avian
influenza virus vaccines protect chickens from Asian H5N1 
high pathogenicity avian influenza virus8 | Vaccination Nation
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Experimentally, vaccinated chickens
challenged with H5N1 showed complete
immunity and no viral shedding. 
The vaccine also allows discrimination
between vaccinated birds and field virus-
infected birds, based on antibodies 
(ie, it is a DIVA vaccine). The bad news,
of course, is that the vaccine will not be
ready for use in the field until it has been
thoroughly tested. Optimistically the
vaccine may be ready in 2007 whilst
pessimists say it may take five years or
longer to develop commercially.
Of course this is a vaccine that is
produced using genetic modification
techniques which some producers might 
find unacceptable. Vaccines made in this
way are permitted under the EU Organic
Regulation.
Below is a précis of the US team’s work
from the Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences (PNAS) of the US.
So, if vaccination is scientifically based; 
if large amounts of money have been
spent developing, testing and storing
vaccines, if vaccination works as it
demonstrably does, why is Defra so
reluctant to use it? As with FMD, it seems
the answer lies in the murky waters of
trade regulation.
Trade issues and 
the wrong conclusion
Governments across the world have also
(on the basis of little or no evidence)
jumped to the conclusion that H5N1 has
been spread around the globe by wild
birds and migration. They have overlooked
the huge global trade in poultry and
poultry products as a vector and have
sought to downplay the role of the illegal
trade in birds and other wildlife, much to
the concern of conservation charities such
as Birdlife International.
“There are several ways in which H5N1
can be spread within and between
countries. It is therefore essential to
monitor and control those activities which
are known or strongly suspected to spread
H5N1. These include the movements of
untreated poultry and poultry products,
the re-use of inadequately cleansed
transportation crates, and the trade in
wild birds. Further investigation is also
needed of the use of potentially infected
poultry manure as fertiliser in agriculture
and as feed in fish-farms and pig farms,
described by the UN Food and Agriculture
organisation as a high-risk activity,” says
Birdlife.
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A recent paper (Chen et al.,
“Establishment of multiple sublineages of
H5N1 influenza virus in Asia: Implications
for pandemic control”, Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences, 21
February 2006) analyses the viral lineages
of AI and concludes that poultry
movements were responsible for multiple
reintroductions in south-east Asia, both
within and between countries.
There is also a huge international trade in
poultry—both legal and illegal. The legal
trade involves millions of hatching eggs
and poultry shipped to destinations world-
wide. For example, prior to the outbreaks
in Egypt, the country was reported to
export 180 million day-old-chicks plus
500,000 mature fowl a year. Almost 12
million live chickens were officially
imported into the Ukraine in 2004 and
more than 16 million into Romania.
Man-Seong Park*, John Steel*, Adolfo
García-Sastre*, David Swayne†, and
Peter Palese
Avian influenza viruses of the H5 and
H7 hemagglutinin subtypes, and
Newcastle disease virus (NDV), are
important pathogens in poultry
worldwide. Specifically, the highly
pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza virus
is a particular threat because it has now
occurred in more than 40 countries on
several continents. Inasmuch as most
chickens worldwide are vaccinated with
a live NDV vaccine, we embarked on
the development of vaccine prototypes
that would have dual specificity and
would allow a single immunization
against both avian influenza and
Newcastle disease. Using reverse
genetics, we constructed a chimeric
avian influenza virus that expressed the
ectodomain of the hemagglutinin-
neuraminidase gene of NDV instead of
the neuraminidase protein of the H5N1
avian influenza virus. Our second
approach to creating a bivalent vaccine
was based on expressing the 
ectodomain of an H7 avian influenza
virus hemagglutinin in a fusogenic and
attenuated NDV background. The
insertion into the NDV genome of the
foreign gene (containing only its
ectodomain, with the transmembrane
and cytoplasmic domains derived from
the F protein of NDV) resulted in a
chimeric virus with enhanced
incorporation of the foreign protein into
virus particles. 
A single immunization of chickens with
this improved vaccine prototype virus
induced not only a 90% protection
against an H7N7 highly pathogenic
avian influenza virus, but also complete
immunity against a highly virulent NDV.
We propose that chimeric constructs
should be developed for convenient,
affordable, and effective vaccination
against avian influenza and Newcastle
disease in chickens and other poultry. 
*Department of Microbiology, Mount Sinai School
of Medicine, New York, NY 10029; and
†Southeast Poultry Research Laboratory,
Agricultural Research Service, U.S. Department of
Agriculture, Athens, GA 30605-2195
Engineered viral vaccine constructs with 
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In Turkey, one factory has the capacity to
produce over 100 million hatching eggs
per year, many of them exported to
Eastern Europe and the Middle East.
Recent outbreaks in India, Nigeria and
Egypt originated within the poultry
industry, and there is strong circumstantial
evidence that movements of poultry and
poultry products are responsible
elsewhere.
2
But it is trade regulation which lies at 
the heart of many government’s obduracy
against the use of vaccination. It is a
condition that reaches elevated proportions
in the UK. There is the historic legacy of
the UK as an island nation at the heart of
its Empire – in other words national pride
and a wish to be dominant in world trade.
As a mechanism for protectionism and
trade dominance the UK and others
devised the notion of disease free zones
along with a select club of “disease-free”
trading nations. Not in the club? Then you
can’t trade.  This issue was discussed in
some depth at the time of the FMD
disaster in 2001. Abigail Woods’ 2001
analysis of national thinking regarding
serious animal contagion is as true for AI
in 2006 as it was for FMD then.
3
“Britain has always been intensely proud
of her ability to abolish disease. Our
island status has meant that several
diseases, once eliminated by stamping
out have been permanently kept out of
the country eg cattle plague, sheep pox,
rabies. This geographical 'difference' has
been continually emphasised as reason
why disease elimination is achievable in
Britain but rather more difficult elsewhere,
and has been used by Government to
justify the rejection of preferred
continental means of disease control in
favour of a stamping out policy.
However, this 'island' status has been
increasingly undermined by the expansion
of free European and world trade and
widespread tourism. This encourages the
introduction of 'foreign' substances into
Britain. Powers to restrict such moves are
extremely limited and inspection as a
means of control can never approach
100% efficacy.  The confidence in British
isolation and its implications for disease
control measures is therefore less justified
than in the past.
In addition the conditions within the
nation have undergone profound changes.
Farm size and livestock holdings have
vastly increased throughout the 20th
Century whilst the numbers of people
involved in agriculture has plummeted.
Agri-business has forced smaller
producers out of the market while
economies of scale and marketing
practices have encouraged the nationwide
movement of livestock.” 
In other words, large-scale agribusiness 
is a generator and disseminator of serious,
trans-boundary diseases. Nonetheless,
stamping out (slaughter) alongside bio-
security measures remains at the heart 
of the regulation of trade in livestock and
products whenever an OIE A list disease
breaks out. Bio-security measures are an
essential element of any strategy, but the
slaughter element is as outdated as British
imperialism. The OIE accepts that
vaccination can be used against A list
diseases, including AI, but it enforces
such draconian measures to keep
vaccinated and non-vaccinated apart that
there is extreme reluctance on the part of
individual countries to follow the
vaccination path.
No justification
There is no human health justification 
for this, no veterinary justification and 
no consumer justification as vaccinated
livestock products are bought and sold
without a second thought everywhere 
in the world. The only rationale that is
offered is that the disease might spread
“by stealth” through vaccinated birds
catching AI but not showing clinical
symptoms. The use of sentinel birds 
and the DIVA testing techniques offer 
real protection against any “stealth” 
spread and between them they highlight
the nonsense of the anti-vaccination
arguments.
When vaccination is used – as in Holland
during 2006, then other nations and
individual commercial enterprises cry 
with horror and invoke protectionist rules,
refusing to import vaccinated poultry and
poultry produce. Or simply they make a
commercial decision which discriminates
against vaccinated products. 
In the UK one of the great hangovers 
from the FMD disaster of 2001 is the
questionable attitude of food processors
and large retailers to the hypothetical
question – would they deal in AI
vaccinated birds and produce or would
they refuse on the basis that consumers
are fearful of vaccinated poultry and 
won’t buy it? In fact, all poultry is routinely
vaccinated against a range of diseases.
Treatments against AI present no
additional consumer risks.
In the view of the RSPCA the vaccination
debate in the UK has now polarised
between those who see it as a barrier to
trade and those who view it as an animal
welfare matter. From an organic perspective
the argument is between the end of organic
poultry production as we know it traded
against the theoretical loss of UK exports in
poultry and poultry products from third
party countries who might refuse to buy
from a vaccinating nation.
1,2 www.birdlife.org/action/species/avian_flu/
3 Woods. A. (2001) FMD Technical 
Update/Historical Perspectives, EFRC10 | Vaccination Nation
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Pioneering EU vaccination – 
The Dutch experience 
The Dutch Government requested
permission for limited use of preventive
vaccination against AI in February
2006.This followed the discovery of
H5N1 in birds just ten miles into Germany
from the Dutch border – no cases have yet
been confirmed in Holland.  Permission
was granted by the European Commission
(Commission Decision 2000/14/EC of 24
February 2006), under strict conditions, 
to vaccinate all hobby poultry, organic
hens and free-range laying hens as a
preventive measure.
This is how the Dutch Agriculture Minister
Cees Veerman communicated the plan
and EC permission to the upper house of
the Netherlands Parliament. Note well the
complex and nightmarish bureaucracy.
“The scheme is an important step towards
ending the EU's non-vaccination policy for
a number of major animal diseases. 
I myself welcome the fact that the
Netherlands can now start preventive
vaccination against the highly pathogenic
H5N1 virus. Vaccination is an alternative
to the requirement that these birds be
kept indoors. In the event of an outbreak,
culling may include vaccinated birds but
culling will only be carried out if this is
absolutely necessary from a veterinary
point of view.
The vaccination plan applies to the period
from March to June 2006 for hobby
poultry and from March 2006 to June
2007 for organic layers and free-range
hens (this in connection with vaccination
during rearing).
The Food and Consumer Product Safety
Authority supervises the vaccination plan.
The plan provides for the manner and the
conditions under which vaccination is to
take place. The plan includes registration,
monitoring and the transport of
vaccinated and non-vaccinated birds. 
The General Inspection Service enforces
the vaccination plan. The Animal Health
Service is in charge of distributing the
vaccines and leg rings. 
The costs of vaccination are to be borne
by the poultry keeper.
It is important to carry out intensive
monitoring in the flocks where preventive
vaccination is carried out, as it is very
difficult to detect infection with the AI
virus in vaccinated birds. The European
Commission considers the Dutch
vaccination plan as a pilot, as little
practical experience has so far been
gained with preventive vaccination of
poultry against H5N1. This is why the
Netherlands is to submit an evaluation 
on the implementation and effectiveness
of the vaccination by the end of June
2006. Sufficient monitoring data should
therefore be available. The monitoring
costs are borne by the Government to
keep participation thresholds as low as
possible.
For commercial poultry producers, the
monitoring practically coincides with the
required three-monthly AI monitoring of
their flocks. Only the introduction of
sentinel birds in their flocks is an
additional measure, which will be funded
by the Government.
The trade of vaccinated and non-
vaccinated birds and products must be
strictly separated to prevent any negative
impact on the trade in non-vaccinated
animals. Consignments of non-vaccinated
poultry, day-old chicks and hatching eggs
must be accompanied by a health
certificate stating that the poultry, day-old
chicks and hatching eggs originate from 
a holding where no vaccination has been
carried out. This is why in the Netherlands
holdings with vaccinated birds and
holdings with non-vaccinated birds must
be strictly separated. A stringent trading
regime applies to all vaccinated poultry
and the products derived from them. 
The normal trading regime applies to
holdings with non-vaccinated flocks.
No poultry, day-old chicks and hatching
eggs originating from holdings where
vaccinated birds are kept, may be moved
without authorisation. The main condition 
of this authorisation is, that the animals 
or products are moved to a
slaughterhouse in the Netherlands or 
to another vaccinated holding in the
Netherlands. Reception of such animals
or products affects the status of the
holding where the vaccinated animals 
or products are received.
Eggs, other than hatching eggs, and
poultry meat from vaccinated holdings
may be traded freely in the Netherlands.
Their transport to other Member States 
is subject to certain conditions. Manure
from vaccinated holdings may not be
moved abroad.
The transport of vaccinated hobby poultry
and their products are also subject to
conditions. In principle, no vaccinated
hobby poultry, day-old chicks and
hatching eggs may be moved. Transport
may only take place under certain
conditions, one of these being that they 
be moved to another vaccinated holding 
in the Netherlands. This prevents
vaccinated birds or products from being
mixed with commercial birds or birds in
other Member States.”
What better endorsement of the ludicrous
nature of current trade policies (even
within the boundaries of the EU) can 
there be than this Dutch testament? The
bureaucracy, complication and expense 
of voluntary vaccination in Holland has
meant that, by May 2006 less than 2 per
cent of hobby birds had been treated. 
One EFRC contact in Holland tested the
regime on three of her valuable rare breed
laying hens. The process took many days
of paperwork and veterinary supervision/
treatment and it cost 50 Euros per bird.
A Mark 2 Dutch vaccination programme
with simpler rules and regulation was
approved by the European Commission 
on 4 July 2006.
The lack of a unified EU-wide approach
has produced extremely worrying – if
understandable – reactions in some
poultry keepers. Vaccination Nation | 11
“3 April '06 - Vaccination of hobby
poultry is still going very slowly.
Logistics and organizing seem to be
very complicated. Besides, a lot of
species are not included in the
programme at all. It is taking too long
for our birds.
Aviornis and NBvH receive more and
more reports of dead birds, because
of their locked up conditions. Geese
just stop eating and crawl into a
corner to die; others have suffocated
because their provisionary roofs
collapsed in the storm and rain. And
then one has not even counted the
hundreds of wild waterfowl in distress.
Most ponds are too small to cover
with red and white ribbons, and the
surrounding fields are too big to cover
with plastic (which is obligatory).
Aviornis and NBvH advise all who
struggle with welfare problems,
bordering on ill-treatment, to stretch
ribbons over the outside fields and
ponds and let the birds out.
After all, there is no bird flu in
Holland. Anyone getting into trouble
with the authority should notify us.
We will do anything within our power
to change the conditions.” 
This is a diary log from the Dutch Hobby Farmer’s 
organisations – the NBvH and Aviornis
Anecdotal evidence from Germany (where
vaccination is not an option) shows hobby
and rare breeds keepers of waterfowl and
other birds, covertly moving stock into
Holland to make use of the vaccination
facilities there. Desperate times make for
desperate measures and what better route
of potential transmission is there than such
birds moving from a country with recent
confirmed cases of H5N1 (Germany) to
one with none so far (Holland).
There have also been serious animal
welfare implications for hobby, free-range
and organic birds well used to extensive
freedom being shut up in unsuitable
accommodation. This has been a particular
problem for waterfowl such as geese,
which are particularly averse to enclosure.
Graphic details of bloodied, severely
injured and dead birds have been recorded
by desperate breeders and keepers.  
In Germany it is reckoned that 50 per cent
of all geese breeders have given up
keeping geese since the lock up began. 
A vigorous campaign is running there 
to save outdoor poultry. 
www.gegen-stallpflicht.de 
In the UK there is growing evidence that
organic turkey and geese producers are
planning ahead and assuming the worst
for H5N1 to arrive in the UK this autumn.
They are choosing to go out of business in
a planned way and abandon the sector
rather than face ruin by investing heavily 
in birds and feed, only to find in the
months to come that their outdoor
production systems are forbidden or their
consumers frightened off by “bird flu fears”.  
CONCLUSION
As the agenda item tabled for the
Defra AI stakeholders meeting in
London on June 2nd 2006 so
succinctly said, for the UK the
time has come to plan carefully
for the arrival and likely endemic
nature of H5N1 in birds.
Defra must act now to –
i/    agree a preventive
vaccination plan for free-
range and organic poultry,
hobby birds and pure breeds
ii/   submit the plan to Brussels
for approval in time for
autumn 2006 and prevent
months of delay in putting 
a policy in place
iii/  ensure there is sufficient
vaccine available to stock 
a preventive vaccination
campaign
The ideal solution, as the UK
anxiously waits for H5N1 AI to
visit us again, is then to roll out 
in the field a programme of
preventive vaccination to build
immunity in the nation’s outdoor
poultry flock well before the
disease becomes endemic.
Once the immediate matter of
preventive vaccination for AI is
effectively dealt with Defra must
move on to change its whole
mindset on the prevention and
control of serious trans-boundary
disease. 
We live in a modern, enlightened
world. Let’s allow our livestock to 
do the same.To download a PDF of this document visit: www.efrc.com/ai
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The Organic Research Centre
“The ideal solution, as the UK anxiously waits for H5N1 AI to visit us again, is
to roll out in the field a programme of preventive vaccination to build immunity
in the nation’s outdoor poultry flock well before the disease becomes endemic.”